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Abstract
In various competitive game contexts, gathering information about one’s opponent and relying
on it for planning a strategy has been the dominant approach for numerous researchers who
deal with what in game theoretic terms is known as the best response problem. This approach
is known as opponent modelling. The general idea is given a model of one’s adversary to rely
on it for simulating the possible ways based on which a game may evolve, so as to then choose
out of a number of response options the most suitable in relation to one’s goals. Similarly, many
approaches concerned with strategising in the context of dialogue games rely on such models for
implementing and employing strategies. In most cases though, the methodologies and the formal
procedures based on which an opponent model may be built and updated receive little attention,
as they are usually left implicit. In this paper we assume a general framework for argumentation-
based persuasion dialogue, and we rely on a logical conception of arguments—based on the recent
ASPIC+ model for argumentation—to formally define a number of mechanisms based on which
an opponent model may be built, updated, and augmented.
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1 Introduction & Related work
Numerous researchers who deal with the best response problem rely on opponent modelling
for implementing, employing and analysing strategies [1, 4, 3, 8, 10, 11, 12]. Essentially,
an opponent model (OM) consists of four basic components: an opponent’s knowledge;
abilities; objectives, and; strategy. However, in most cases the methodologies and the formal
procedures based on which such a model may be built and updated are often either left
implicit, or are just concerned with particular components of the model.
Specifically, in the context of argumentation-based dialogue games, Riveret et al. [10, 11]
model the possible knowledge of their opponents in the form of arguments, assuming that
arguers are perfectly informed about all the arguments previously advanced by all other
players. Their investigation concerns games of perfect information, and assumes that the
participants’ goals always comply with the dialogical objectives of the game, an assumption
which, as McBurney et al. argue in [7], does not always hold. Oren et al. [8] present a
generally complete approach through modelling both an agent’s knowledge in the form of
arguments as well as their goals, while in a similar sense to [4] they also allow for nested OMs.
Additionally, they argue that given the knowledge about an opponent’s goals it is also possible
to indirectly model its strategy. However, nowhere in the aforementioned work is the problem
of acquiring and maintaining an OM discussed. An interesting exception proposed by Black
et al. [1] concerns a mechanism that enables agents to model preference information about
others—what is important to another agent—and then rely on this information for making
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proposals that are more likely to be agreeable. In their case the mechanism responsible for
modelling an agent’s preferences is explicitly provided.
In this work, we attempt to formally address the problem of opponent modelling through
providing two mechanisms concerned with how an OM may be built, updated and possibly
augmented. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we briefly present the
basic components of an ASPIC+-based framework for persuasion dialogue. In Section 3 we
present two mechanisms responsible for building, updating and augmenting an OM. Finally,
in Section 4 we summarise and discuss future directions for our work.
2 An ASPIC+ framework for persuasion dialogues
In [9] Prakken describes an argumentation framework (AF ) by assuming an unspecified
logical language (L) and by defining arguments as inference trees formed by applying strict
(Rs) or defeasible (Rd) inference rules of the form ϕ1, . . . , ϕn → ϕ respectively ϕ1, . . . ,
ϕn ⇒ ϕ. To define attacks between arguments, minimal assumptions on L are made; namely
that certain well formed formulæ (wff) are a contrary or contradictory of certain other wff.
Apart from this the framework is still abstract: it applies to any set of Rs and Rd and
to any L with a defined contrary relation. Arguments are then constructed with respect
to a knowledge base that is assumed to contain three kinds of premises that are wff in L.
These premises are expressed through a set of three disjoint subsets K = Kn ∪ Kp ∪ Ka:
Kn is the (necessary) axioms (which cannot be attacked); Kp is the ordinary premises (on
which attacks succeed contingent upon satisfying certain preference criteria1), and; Ka is
the assumptions (on which attacks are always successful, cf. assumptions in [2]). Thus an
ASPIC+ argument in a set A of arguments that may be constructed from the aforementioned
logical components, may either be a single premise, or a chain of premises and rules that
lead to a certain conclusion. Lastly, three kinds of attack are defined for arguments. B ∈ A
can attack A ∈ A by attacking a premise or conclusion of A, or a defeasible inference step
in A. Some kinds of attack succeed as defeats independently of preference criteria, whereas
others succeed only if the attacked argument is not stronger than the attacking argument.
We assume a general framework for persuasion dialogue where the participants, a pro-
ponent (P ) and an opponent (O), debate the truth of a claim ϕ through exchanging dialogue
moves (DMs) consisting of arguments, based on the attack relationship between them and on
a set of protocol rules that regulate the dialogue process; i.e. a participant can introduce an
argument into the game if it attacks another argument that was previously introduced into
the game by its interlocutor. We assume that the participants share the same L and the same
contrary relation definition; i.e. there is agreement as to whether a given argument attacks
another. In this respect, we define a dialogue D as a sequence of dialogue moves < DM0,
. . ., DMn >, where the content of DM0 is an argument for ϕ, while we assume that the
dialogue process is regulated by a multi-reply protocol. The latter means that backtracking
is allowed, which implies that a participant can return to a previous point in the game and
attack against a previous move of its interlocutor in a different way. Thus a dialogue may
also be expressed in the form of a dialogue tree (T ), as the one illustrated in Figure 1(a),
where each node is a DM and each arc indicates a move’s target (a backtracking example is
P ’s argument G introduced by DM6 in Figure 1(a)). Full details of the ASPIC+ framework
as well as of the proposed dialogue framework can be found in [9] and [5] respectively.
1 An important feature of the ASPIC+ framework is the employment of preference-orderings over defeasible
rules and non-axiom premises which we do not take into account for the purpose of this paper.
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We assume that the accumulated logical information introduced by a participant in D is
stored in a commitment store which we define as follows:
I Definition 1. Given a set of agents Ags = {Ag1, . . . , Agν} participating in D = < DM0,
. . ., DMn >, then for any agent Agi we define its commitment store as a tuple CSit =<
Kit,Rit >, where Kit, and Rit, are respectively the premises and the rules moved into the
game by Agi up to turn t, for t = 0 . . . n, such that CSi0 = ∅, and CSit+1 is obtained by
augmenting CSit with the logical information provided by the dialogue move DMt+1.
Finally, we assume that each agent Agi ∈ Ags can engage in dialogues in which its
strategic selection of moves may be based on what Agi believes its interlocutor (in the set
Agj 6=i) knows. Accordingly, and in a similar sense to the approach employed in [8], each Agi
maintains a model of its possible opponent agents. In contrast with [8], the proposed model
consists of the goals and knowledge other agents may use to construct arguments, rather
than just the abstract arguments and their relations.
I Definition 2. Let Ags = {Ag1, . . . , Agν} be a set of agents. For i = 1 . . . ν, the knowledge
base KB of Agi is a tuple KBi =< S(i,1), . . . , S(i,ν) > such that for j = 1 . . . ν, each sub-base
S(i,j) = 〈K(i,j),R(i,j),G(i,j)〉 is an OM expressing what Agi believes is Agj ’s premises (K(i,j)),
rules (R(i,j)), and goals (G(i,j)), and where S(i,i) represents Agi’s own beliefs and goals.
3 Modelling mechanisms
We begin by associating a confidence value c to the logical components of the information sets
found in a sub-base S(i,j). Essentially, for an agent Agi this value expresses the probability
of a certain logical component in S(i,j) being part of Agj ’s actual knowledge. For the
computation of this value we differentiate between whether a particular information is:
gathered directly by Agi, on the basis of its opponent’s updated commitment store, or; a
result of an augmentation attempt of Agi’s current model of Agj . The latter concerns an
incrementation of a current OM with the addition of arguments that are likely to also be
known to Agi’s opponent.
Intuitively, in real life we tend to assume that certain information, if known, is then
likely to be related with other information, i.e. that there is some relevance between distinct
pieces of information, which in our case may be translated as relevance between arguments.
For example, assume that two agents, Agi (a proponent) and Agj (an opponent), engage
in a dialogue as the one described in Figure 1(a), where Agi and Agj introduce arguments
{A,C,E,G} respectively {B,D,F,H}. Assume then, that Agi engages in another dialogue
with the same root move A, but with a different agent Agm who also happens to counter
A with argument B. It is then reasonable to assume that Agm is likely to also know of
arguments D, H or even F . In this respect, the basic idea is, given an OM—which in essence
describes a set of arguments known to one’s opponent—and a mapping of a broader set
of arguments with respect to a relevance factor, to then augment the OM by including
arguments—and thus the logical elements that compose them—that have a high probability
to also be known to that opponent, based on their relevance relationship with arguments
already in the OM.
For assigning a confidence value c to the elements of an S(i,j), we will assume that every
agent retains its own rules and premises without revision but relies on argumentation theory
and semantics for resolving conflicts. In this respect, an agent’s beliefs are formed based
on deciding on the acceptability level of its arguments according to a number of different
acceptability semantics. Thus in the face of new information nothing is replaced or discarded,
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but instead certain arguments may simply cease to be or may become acceptable under
different semantics. We will therefore assume that the confidence value of information acquired
directly from the commitment store of one’s interlocutor is equal to 1, which represents the
highest level of confidence. However, this assumption must exclude information concerned
with goals (G) as those cannot be retained in the face of conflicts, i.e. it is not reasonable for
an agent to be in pursue of conflicting goals at the same time. We leave the provision of a
function for updating an opponent’s goals to future work.
I Definition 3. Assume an S(i,j) ∈ KBi, then for Y ∈ {K(i,j),R(i,j),G(i,j)}, X is a tuple
< x, c > where x ∈ Y , and where c represents the confidence level of x such that:
c[0,1] =
{
1 if x is directly collected by Agi (a)
Pr(x) if x is part of an augmentation of S(i,j) (b)
where Pr(x) is the likelihood of x being also known to Agj , given its current OM (S(i,j)).
I Definition 4. Let Agi and Agj be two agents in Ags such that 1 ≤ i, j ≤ ν and i 6= j, and
h(i,j) =< D1, . . . ,Dµ−1 > be Agi’s history of dialogues with Agj . Then, given the current
version of sub-base Sµ−1(i,j) = 〈Kµ−1(i,j),Rµ−1(i,j),Gµ−1(i,j)〉 and the commitment store CSj =< Kj,Rj >
of the latest dialogue Dµ, Agi can update its sub-base Sµ(i,j) = 〈Kµ(i,j),Rµ(i,j),Gµ(i,j)〉 such
that: (a) Kµ(i,j) = Kµ−1(i,j) ∪ Kj, and; (b) Rµ(i,j) = Rµ−1(i,j) ∪Rj.
For augmenting a current OM, we rely on a relevance graph.
I Definition 5. For an agent Agi, let Hi = {h(i,1), . . . , h(i,ν)} be the set of all its histories,
then an abstract relevance graph (ARG) is a weighted directed graph G = {V,R}, where
V is a set that consists of all arguments AH encountered by Agi in Hi, and where R is a set
of weighted arcs, each of them indicating a relevance relationship between two arguments in
G, based on a weight function w, such that w : R→ [0, 1].
3.1 Building a relevance graph
We assume an ARG to be incrementally built as an agent Agi engages in numerous dialogues,
being empty at the beginning, and constantly updated with newly encountered opponent
arguments (OAs). Notice that OAs appear only in the odd levels of a tree (Figure 1(a)). For
assigning arcs between these arguments one may rely on how and when an argument appears
in a dialogue tree. Specifically, we rely on the following condition:
I Condition 1. Given a dialogue tree T , then for any argument A that appears in level i,
and any argument B that appears in level j, for i and j being odd numbers and j ≥ i, if
j−i
2 ≤ n, and there exists a path between A and B in T , there is an arc from A to B in G.
Figures 1(b) and 1(c) illustrate two distinct ARGs induced from the dialogue tree
of Figure 1(a), for n = 1 and n = 2 respectively. Intuitively, this modelling approach
simply reflects the implied relationship that consecutive OAs have in a single branch of
a tree. Through modifying the n value one can strengthen or weaken the connectivity,
and so the relationship, between arguments in the induced ARG. However, one may
choose to deviate from this particular modelling approach, adopting a different one so as
to reflect a different kind of implied relationship between arguments. Lastly, for a pair of
arguments {A,B} connected with an arc r, let w(rAB) be the weight value of an arc r which
extends from argument A to argument B, we assume w(rAB) to be equal to the number
of agents NAB that have moved A followed by B in a dialogue game, thus satisfying the
relevance condition for n = 1, against the total number of agents |Ags| minus agent Agi, i.e.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 1 (a) A dialogue tree T where the grey and the white nodes concern P ’s respectively O’s
moves, (b) A 1-hop ARG modelling approach (c) A 2-hop ARG modelling approach.
w(rAB) = NAB/(|Ags| − 1). Dividing NAB with (|Ags| − 1) is necessary for normalising the
arcs’ weight values into probabilities.
3.2 Relevance augmentation
Given an ARG an agent Agi can then attempt to augment its OM of Agj (i.e. its S(i,j))
by adding to it the logical information comprised in the arguments (nodes) that are of
1-hop distance in G from those that can be constructed from S(i,j). In a trivial case, let
Ags = {Ag1, Ag2, Ag3, Ag4}, and G be an ARG induced by Ag1 based on dialogues D1 and
D2 for n = 1, as it appears in Figure 2(c). Let S(1,4) be Ag1’s OM of Ag4 such that Ag1
believes that Ag4 can construct two arguments A = {B,H}. Thus Ag1’s OM of Ag4 can be
expressed as a sub-graph GA = {A,∅} of G (the yellow nodes in Figure 2(c)). Hence, Ag1
computes the likelihood of each of the possible augmentations A′ ∈ P of A as those appear
in set P = {A′∅,A′D,A′F ,A′DF } (Figure 2(c)), and selects the one with the highest likelihood
for augmenting S(1,4). Given that the instantiation of an augmented OM relies on the arcs’
weights of G, we have to provide an arc-centric formula for computing this probability, as
there are multiple ways based on which a particular augmentation may be induced. In other
words and in graph theoretic terms, a possible augmentation of an OM is interpreted as a
possible graph expansion. Thus a certain A′ may be induced as a result of numerous possible
expansions of GA, each containing different arcs while having the same set of arguments.
For example, assume we want to calculate the likelihood of augmentation A′F = {B,H,F}.
Let S(A′F ) = {G1, G2, G3} be the possible expansions of GA which induce A′F by including
in GA: either only rBF creating G1; either only rHF creating G2, or; only rBF and rHF
creating G3. Hence, the likelihood of A′F is: Pr(A′F ) = Pr(G1) + Pr(G2) + Pr(G3)
⇔ Pr(A′F ) = w(rBF ) · (1−w(rBD)) · (1−w(rHF )) +w(rHF ) · (1−w(rBF )) · (1−w(rBD)) +
w(rBF ) ·w(rHF ) · (1−w(rBD)) ⇔ Pr(A′F ) = 0.35937. Finally, the confidence value c of the
newly included information in S(1,4) is assigned a value equal to the likelihood of the chosen
augmentation as defined by Definition 3(b), i.e. Pr(x) = Pr(A′).
For providing the general formula for computing the likelihood of a possible augmentation
we rely on basic graph theory notation with respect to a node A in a graph G, such as degree
d(A), adjacent vertices N(A) where |N(A)| = d(A), adjacent arcs R(A), and arc weights
w(r). We additionally define NS for a set of arguments S such that NS =
⋃
A∈S N(A)|{X ∈
N(A) : X /∈ S}, and RS =
⋃
A∈S R(A)|{rAB ∈ R(A) : B /∈ S}. Additionally, let A be the
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2 (a) A dialogue D1 between Ag1 & Ag2 (b) A dialogue D2 between Ag1 & Ag3 (c) An ARG
induced by Ag1 from D1 & D2, and the image of Ag1’s OM of Ag4 on it (the yellow nodes B & H).
set of all arguments that may be induced from a single sub-base S(i,j), then given that an
ARG is essentially built from a number of OMs, then it must hold that A ⊆ AH. Provided
A, we assume A′ to be an augmentation of A based on G, such that A′ = A∪ S for S ⊆ NA.
In this sense, we assume GA = {A,∅} to be a sub-graph of G representing an image of an
agent’s Agi current OM of another agent Agj in G, while we also assume GA′ = {A′, Ri} to
be a possible expansion of GA, where Ri ⊆ RA. Given these, let P = {A′0,A′1, . . . ,A′µ−1} be
the set of all possible distinct augmentations of A, then the number of all possible distinct
expansions of GA with respect to neighbouring nodes that are of 1-hope distance from it, is:
µ = |P | =
|NA|∑
i=0
(|NA|
i
)
(1)
Furthermore, let S(A′) = {G1A′ , . . . , GnA′} be a set of graphs containing all expanded graphs
that have the same set of arguments A′ such that GA′ = {A′, Rj} for Rj ⊆ RA, then the
general formula for computing the likelihood of a possible augmentation is:
Pr(A′) =
n∑
Gi=1A′ ∈S(A′)
∏
r∈Rj
w(r) ·
∏
r∈RA/Rj
(1− w(r))
 (2)
Finally, since the likelihood of each possible augmentation should define a distribution of
likelihoods then it must hold that:
µ−1∑
A′
i=0
Pr(A′i) = 1 (3)
4 Conclusions & Future direction
In this work we have addressed the problem of building, updating and augmenting an OM in
argumentation-based dialogues. We relied on a logical conception of arguments based on
the recent ASPIC+ model for argumentation, and provided two modelling mechanisms: an
update mechanism, and; an augmentation mechanism.
We have particularly focused on the latter, which relies on the relevance between inform-
ation and attempts an augmentation of a current OM through the addition of information.
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The latter is based on computing the likelihoods of a set of possible augmentations and
choosing the one with the highest value. A drawback of the proposed approach is that,
given a G, all possible augmentations of a set A is equal to |P | = 2|N(A)| (each adjacent
argument is either in or out of the augmentation), where NA is the adjacent arguments of
A (its neighbours), which implies that the complexity of computing the likelihoods of all
possible augmentations of A increases exponentially as the number of the 1-hop neighbours
of A increases. This makes the approach practically intractable.
However, drawing inspiration from the work of Li et al. [6] we intend to rely on an
approximate approach for computing these likelihoods based on a Monte-Carlo simulation.
Therefore our immediate future direction is to formally describe the exact simulation process
for the proposed augmentation method. Additionally, we also intend to evaluate our approach
through experimenting with software agents that engage in dialogue disputes. Particularly,
we will compare the success rate of agents that rely on OMs and a relevance augmentation
mechanism to agents who rely on simple opponent modelling and to agents who do not rely
on opponent modelling at all.
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